(UN)MASKING AUTHENTICITY: CREATIVE WRITING AND THE MASK by Stevenson, Kieran
 (UN)MASKING AUTHENTICITY: CREATIVE 
WRITING AND THE MASK 
Kieran Stevenson | Deakin University  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In the realms of literature and creative writing, there is a unique 
legitimacy conferred upon works which are seen as ‘authentic’. This 
results in a hierarchical organisation of styles and genres which 
exists external and prior to any individual text. This paper explores 
the claim to authenticity of ‘realist’ literary fiction in Australia and 
attempts to challenge that hierarchy from the perspective of 
Nietzsche’s work on the concept of the mask. Central to this 
argument is an analysis of Kurt Vonnegut’s novel Cat’s Cradle and 
its awareness of the relationship between truth and illusion. 
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 ‘[...] like most sci-fi, the book will disappoint any reader who insists on 
the evolving, three dimensional characters of the realist novel.’ 
(Kunkel 2008: viii) 
 
I was looking at Kurt Vonnegut’s novel Cat’s Cradle (2008, first published 
1963) in the hope of building a critique of the idea of ‘authentic’ fiction when I 
read the introduction by American novelist Benjamin Kunkel. What catches 
the eye initially is the careful unkindness of it; one could be forgiven for 
thinking that Kunkel is not really fond of the novel at all. He devotes some 
energy to cataloguing what are, in his opinion, the weakest components of both 
the book and science-fiction generally. He speaks only guardedly about the 
virtues of the genre and even then, he takes pains to tell the reader that there 
are other science-fiction authors far more capable than Vonnegut, who had 
died the year before Kunkel was contracted to write his introduction. So it goes. 
With the propriety of such an introduction to one side, what’s really important 
is the territory it attempts to stake out. It uses as its critical foundation a quote 
by Fredric Jameson, which addresses the ‘conventionality, inauthenticity [...] 
[and] formal stereotyping’ of science-fiction (Kunkel 2008: xi). By making a 
quick series of claims for ‘realist’ fiction—evolving, three-dimensional, 
authentic, indeed even the term ‘realist’ is heavy with connotations—Kunkel is 
attempting to establish realist fiction as a sort of formal centre, a neutral 
ground from which the so-called genres diverge. Vonnegut’s novel, in contrast 
with Kunkel’s own work, is not ‘realist’, and therefore cannot be realistic or 
real, neither truly weighty nor deep except in spite of the limitations of its 
genre. It is important to note that when I speak of ‘realist’ fiction I am 
interpreting Kunkel’s use of the term, which seems to derive largely from the 
current formulation of the genres. I am not speaking of the nineteenth century 
movements, nor any one school or historical categorisation of literature. I am 
speaking only of fiction which seeks to present things ‘as they are’—absent 
fantastical elements, strange settings, or implausible plots. While for Kunkel 
and many others today this may be aligned with artistic credibility, it is 
interesting to note that many writers and theorists associated with earlier 
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formulations of the term disputed this stricture. In ‘The Art of Fiction’ (1894), 
Henry James writes ‘humanity is immense, and reality has many forms’ (1894: 
387 – 388) in response to the suggestion that writers should aim for exactitude 
only in line with their personal experience. In ‘A Note on Realism’ (2012), 
Robert Louis Stevenson writes of ‘the truth of literary art’ that ‘it may be told 
to us in a carpet comedy, in a novel of adventure, or a fairy tale’. ‘Be as ideal or 
as abstract as you please,’ he writes. ‘You will be none the less veracious’. For 
these writers, and for past conceptions of ‘realism’, richness of detail and 
serious care of thought were the key to artistic value, not mere resemblance. 
For Kunkel and the version of realism he champions, the two have become 
confused. Resemblance—to the real world, to real people, to real situations—is 
depth, richness, and meaning. Vonnegut’s work is, for Kunkel, largely 
conflated with science-fiction as a whole, which in its separation from 
resemblance offers only a ‘small group of novels with a permanent place in 
American fiction’ (2008: xii). The implication is clear enough: all of the formal, 
stylistic and narrative choices of ‘non-realist’ fiction are diversions, masks of 
varying purpose placed over the ‘authentic’ domain of this contemporary 
realist fiction, which implicitly speaks in the natural voice, with natural 
characters, and explores natural themes and settings. I intend to put forward 
another idea: in no real sense is realist fiction different from the wilfully 
unrealistic. These non-realist works do employ masks to denote and 
foreground a territory so that they might reveal something to us. But whatever 
they’re obscuring, it’s not authenticity. On the contrary, this particular 
formulation of authenticity is just another mask.  
It might seem like an odd choice to use an American sci-fi novel to open an 
exploration of literary realism today, but Cat’s Cradle speaks directly to the 
question of truth in literature. It has its eyes wide open to the inherent 
inauthenticity of human stories. The first words the reader sees after Kunkel’s 
introduction are: ‘Nothing in this book is true’ (2008: introductory page). The 
story of the novel is pervaded by a fictional religion called Bokononism. ‘The 
first sentence in The Books of Bokonon is this: ‘All of the true things I am about 
to tell you are shameless lies’ (2008: 4). Vonnegut immediately sets up this 
recursive loop of self-referential paradoxes between his novel and its sham 
religion, destabilising the distinction between what is true and false, and he 
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foregrounds this theme at every opportunity. The story is set on the fictional 
Caribbean island of San Lorenzo, a mish-mash caricature of impoverished 
nations which runs on a dynamic tension intentionally manufactured by its 
dictator ‘Papa’ Monzano and its holy man, Bokonon. The religion is outlawed: 
nobody on the island will admit to being a Bokononist, but everybody is, 
including ‘Papa’. As one character says, all the people on the island are 
‘employed full time as actors in a play they [understand], that any human being 
anywhere could understand and applaud’ (2008: 124). It is clear that Vonnegut 
is not just talking about San Lorenzo. The whole book is replete at every turn 
with new ironies and untruths that highlight the inherently and obviously 
constructed ways we navigate a harsh reality. It is when we try to act on the 
grounds of some transcendental truth and deny that a concomitant untruth 
has been with us the whole time that we are taken advantage of and robbed of 
our only genuine path to agency. Newt Hoenikker, one of the characters in the 
book, mounts a cynical attack on the titular children’s game, where string is 
looped over the fingers in a kind of net. ‘‘No wonder kids grow up crazy’’, he 
says. ‘‘A cat’s cradle is nothing but a bunch of X’s between somebody’s hands, 
and little kids look and look and look at all those X’s ... no damn cat, and no 
damn cradle’’ (2008: 118). It is his refrain for every lie that presents itself as 
authentic—his sister’s abusive marriage presented as idyllic, his own childhood 
of neglect presented as loving. ‘‘See the cat?’ asks Newt. ‘See the cradle?’’ 
(2008: 128). One of the novel’s darkest jokes about the violence that lurks 
within the gaps of truth is one of its most offhand. An American industrialist, 
fed up with the rebellious minds of his American workers, is going to San 
Lorenzo to open a factory. ‘‘The people down there’, he says, ‘are poor enough 
and scared enough and ignorant enough to have some common sense!’’ (2008: 
64). Vonnegut sees clearly what Kunkel does not: a story which claims unique 
certainty of truth only differs from one which does not in its attempt to seize 
the mantle of authority and authenticity.  
It could be argued that some Australian literary institutions share Kunkel’s 
preoccupation with this realist ‘authenticity’, albeit in their own way. If the 
Miles Franklin Award can be taken as a somewhat accurate yardstick for the 
state of the national literature given its stated function of designating 
‘successful’ Australian novels, and novels which are successfully Australian, it 
c i n d e r  
 
Steve ns on    ( Un) mas ki ng Reali ty  
5 
paints a definite picture. While non-realist works frequently make the 
shortlist, with very few exceptions the novels which have won the award 
embody my use of the term ‘realist’ fiction. There have been exceptions; some 
of the prize-winners have departed with the default format and played with 
alternative forms of the literary novel—the high modernism of Patrick White’s 
Voss (1957) or the experimentalism of David Ireland’s novels, for example—
but these points of departure remain just that, eventually subsumed back into 
the persistent thread of naturalistic literary realism. There is one opposing 
thread to this which continues today, whereby the winning books by 
Indigenous authors, such as Alexis Wright, have broken with this particular 
realism either in style or content. These books explore Aboriginal storytelling 
traditions or use non-realist elements to throw the issues facing Aboriginal 
people into sharper relief. A suitably thorough analysis of this particular break 
is beyond the scope of this paper. It is, however, important to note the 
significant political connotations of this separation and to highlight that 
suggesting that novels by Aboriginal authors are not bound by the strictures of 
traditional settler-Australian realism is absolutely not to suggest that they are 
free from their own strict parameters when considered as examples of the 
national literature.  
It should be said that using the Miles Franklin as a foundation here is not 
comprehensive or damning in and of itself; it is as much a look at the workings 
of prize culture and its effects on the industry of literature as it is an 
investigation of the state of the art. However, hidden within its twin claims to 
rewarding presentations of ‘Australian life in any of its phases’ and to being the 
country’s ‘most prestigious literature prize’ (Miles Franklin Literary Award 
2017: para. 1) are two others: that it is an authority on what constitutes an 
authentic presentation of Australian life, and that its judgment on artistic value 
is unmatched. This creates a feedback loop, dictating what gets read, reviewed, 
sold and therefore published. It sits atop the system with which writers are 
forced to negotiate, and in its selection process it has broadly privileged a 
particular kind of realist work as representative of the ideal, authentically 
Australian novel. Whether intentional or not, this sends a message in harmony 
with Kunkel’s: there is the serious, realist work that makes up the canon, and 
there is the rest. 
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What can be seen in the attempt by industry authorities like the Miles Franklin 
to put together an authentic Australian realist literature is a collective anxiety 
over identity and authority. Canadian literary theorist Terry Goldie, in an 
investigation of Australian literary hoaxes and imposture, talks about the 
endless turning point white Australians find themselves in, identifying as 
native but alienated from the Indigenous population, therefore identifying as 
migrant but also alienated from migrant communities due to the 
aforementioned identification as native (2004: 96 – 98). He links this to our 
truncated emancipation from the British Empire and what Bob Hodge and 
Vijay Mishra call the ‘bastard complex’—Hodge and Mishra note that the 
common colloquial and affectionate use of the term ‘bastard’ in Australia 
suggests an attempt to ‘[affirm] illegitimacy in order to evade an anxiety about 
origins’ (2004: 97). Goldie writes: 
It is important to create an Australian who can be the authority of being 
Australian; and yet the authorised Australian has traits which both 
oppose and deny authority: it is difficult to be authentically Australian 
when the authentic Australian is likely to be opposed to authenticity 
(2004: 96). 
Goldie observes in Australian literary efforts the irresolvable attempt to find 
our own skin—childlike or mature, native or migrant, independent or vestigial. 
We are looking for the right mask to wear. From this viewpoint, the emergent 
‘authentic’ realist Australian body of work makes sense: it is false bravado, a 
defensive statement of identity in the face of the fear that we might be nothing 
at all. When such uncertainty reigns, it may make sense to attempt a grounding 
gesture, a dismissal of any work which seems unconcerned with reinforcing 
the concrete terms of Australian life. However, this gesture itself reinforces the 
mistaken realist claim that resemblance is aligned with reality, with the Real 
and what’s really going on.  
But what would writing on the Real actually entail? A Lacanian Real, that 
which is external to our perceived symbolic reality, what Zizek terms an 
‘inherent point of failure for symbolisation’ (2000: 121), is not the concern of 
realist fiction. The Real in this sense is only bound to contemporary realist 
literature in the same sense that it is bound to and underpins any symbolic 
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construction of language, including the most ‘unrealistic’ of fiction. In truth we 
cannot write it. More than that, this constructed realism tends to not even 
approach it. The staggering cosmic violence and insubstantiality underpinning 
everything, the irresolvable rupture between the symbolic we experience and 
the reality we inhabit, these things we feel whispering at the edges of our 
capacity for perception and expression—they are most often well outside our 
particular cultural field of view. Other canons have works which grapple with 
these ideas, to the extent that they can; McCarthy’s ‘sacred violence’ or the 
abject voids of Beckett’s novels are examples which arguably try to get at the 
Real through decidedly otherworldly realities. However, they too suffer in their 
nature from the reduction of subjectivity and symbolism and, returning to 
Zizek and Lacan, are perhaps ‘touch[ing] the real through the symbolic’ (2000: 
121), but not speaking from within it. So we are stymied again. Even by 
attacking the Real we can only end up with another flawed formulation if we 
try to use the term ‘realism’: one based on concept rather than resemblance, 
and arguably therefore more philosophically robust but no more truthful, no 
more ‘real’. If our current, broadly Kunkelian iteration of realism is to be taken 
seriously in its claims to reality, it must be weighed in this fashion against the 
Real. And if it is, then we see again: there is no cat. There is no damn cradle. 
So if the cultural privileging of common realism as Australia’s default form 
doesn’t actually speak to the Real, what is it doing? If anything, it seeks to 
establish a sort of democracy of perception in order to safeguard against the 
Real. The resulting consensus, which it must be emphasised again is mostly 
established in retrospect rather than at the moment of writing, serves to affirm 
a cultural mood, a safe way of being and a sort of touchstone in that frantic and 
circuitous search for the self. It represents a mutual ratification—between 
awards panels, critics, authors, booksellers and a shrinking readership—of a 
so-called ‘real world’ and an accepted ontological mode. It is a productive 
mask: it allows us to stake claim to a territory where we can safely produce, but 
it also demarcates clearly the limits of our collective investment in who we are 
and what aspects of ourselves we are willing to examine and challenge. These 
limits have changed over time, almost entirely for the better, broadening our 
gallery of voices and stories, but just because the common ground has 
expanded its membership it does not mean that it has fundamentally changed 
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the method of its operation. Works which fall outside this common ground are 
still seen as ‘inauthentic’, with all the implicit emptiness that term suggests.  
While Australia’s particular anxious realist journey might have its own quirks, 
it proceeds on the basis of a ubiquitous mechanism—all creative writing 
involves the fashioning and wearing of masks, specifically a Nietzschean 
masking, the notion that we reveal more profound things by the ways we 
choose to conceal ourselves than by our search for ‘truth’. In Beyond Good and 
Evil, Nietzsche writes: ‘Everything that is profound loves the mask; the 
profoundest things of all hate even image and parable’ (1990: 69). Here again 
we find the Lacanian Real, resisting symbolisation. The seed idea at the base 
of this is explicated simply by Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Nietzsche in 
What is Philosophy: ‘Thought is creation, not will to truth’ (1994: 54, emphasis 
mine). For Nietzsche, creative thought is not a path to an objective and 
universal truth beneath the surface of things. Wherever one claims to have 
reached this truth, there is always more waiting to be unearthed, a gap into 
which everything unspoken and unspeakable can fit (1990: 216). Returning for 
a moment to Cat’s Cradle, we can see that Vonnegut understands, perhaps 
better than Kunkel, how things are revealed through masks. One of the 
characters in the book is a professional indexer. She is able to discern simply 
from reading the index of a local history book the author’s deepest secrets: that 
he is in love with the dictator’s daughter, but he will never marry her because 
he is also secretly gay. ‘‘Never index your own book’’, says the indexer (2008: 
87). The author has tried to hide himself behind an objective historical text, 
and in so doing has revealed himself. Nietzche knows that this is always the 
case: ‘Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy’, he writes. ‘Every opinion 
is also a hiding-place, every word also a mask’ (1990: 216). 
If the individual writer is enacting this movement, masking and revealing 
based on creative thought rather than truth, then the collective construct of the 
‘realist’ novel becomes a categorisation after the fact, a logical error which, per 
Deleuze, mistakes the ‘resemblance of the many’ for the ‘permanence of the 
One’ (2014: 160). In this case it sets up a sort of Platonic ur-novel which cannot 
exist but to which we constantly refer and compare. The resultant 
categorisation commits two injustices: it fails to recognise the singular life at 
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the heart of each individual work within the category of realist fiction in the 
same breath that it claims privileged position for itself and holds the non-
realist at arms’ length. There is a strange sort of generic flattening that results: 
the realists of the world become practitioners of a proud tradition, varying in 
technique but essentially completing the same task of the ‘truthful’ work. The 
others, the Kafkas and Shelleys, are always divergent from this centre: bizarre 
outliers that crop up to destabilise things. Where they congregate in great 
enough numbers to threaten the realist paradigm, a schism occurs and a 
parallel, inferior offshoot is created: Magical Realism, Speculative Fiction, 
Horror, and so on. Mary Shelley was simply an author until it became 
necessary that she be erroneously labelled one of a score of different alleged 
inventors of science-fiction. This is not unique: Ursula Le Guin has stated her 
desire that ‘somebody, somewhere, sometime, just talk about [her] as an 
American novelist’ (Phillips 2012), and for his part Vonnegut said ‘I have been 
a soreheaded occupant of a file drawer labelled ‘science fiction’... and I would 
like out, since so many serious critics regularly mistake the drawer for a urinal’ 
(2014: 1). This protest against inferior categorisation is important. When 
identifying a crucial flaw in the Platonic project, Deleuze notes: ‘Socrates 
distinguishes himself from the Sophist, but the Sophist does not distinguish 
himself from Socrates, placing the legitimacy of such a distinction in question’ 
(2014: 163). While there are indeed those for whom the title of ‘genre writer’ is 
a comfortable fit, for as long as the genres have existed in concept there have 
been those who have seen it as an external imposition, a wilfully reductive 
prefix designed to separate and minimise. 
The crucial thing, especially given how much this imposition of authenticity 
relies on industrial and institutional curation long after a work has already 
been produced, is the question of what this says about writing. My point is 
certainly not that stories outside the realist style should be privileged above 
those within it, or that realistic elements should be avoided by writers. If this 
inquiry is hoping for anything, it’s an elevation of sidelined forms and styles to 
equal realism in the communal consciousness. Or better yet, the abolition of 
these categories—even if only temporarily within the writer themselves—to 
allow a natural flow between them where previously they have been limited, so 
that we might enjoy an inherent freedom at the beginning of writing to 
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approach each piece with a view to how it can best be brought to bear, rather 
than best exemplify any notion of what is ‘correct’ in form or style. It is certain 
that while the collection and designation of authentic and inauthentic work is 
done en masse and after the fact, these categorical actions have a self-
reinforcing influence on the production of future work in a way that can only 
be limiting. As a principle of process, awareness of this false authenticity 
dynamic can be incorporated as a sort of reminder of potential. The hope is 
that our continued thread of national literature, such as it is, can make space 
alongside itself for our own Vonnegut or Le Guin to emerge without the threat 
of minimisation, because if a ‘national identity’ as such is to emerge organically 
within our literature, it is impossible to expect that there will be individual 
books which perfectly represent that identity. It must be polyvocal in nature, 
the harmony created by numerous stories embodying only themselves. 
Nascent publisher Brow Books is one example of this emergence already taking 
place: Briohny Doyle’s The Island Will Sink (2016) and Shaun Prescott’s The 
Town (2017), the first a cli-fi dystopian novel and the second a surrealistic take 
on the well-worn topic of small-town Australian life, represent wilful breaks 
from the idea of realism as the only way to write or sell a serious book. It is up 
to industry bodies like the Miles Franklin Award to enable this movement. It 
is my opinion that should Australian literature wish to survive, these shifts are 
inevitable, as the publishing industry seeks to accommodate a generation of 
writers raised in the era of globalisation, writers who have had unprecedented 
access to works across a vast field of genre, style and point of origin. 
The second line of Cat’s Cradle, directly beneath the disclaimer that nothing 
within the book is true, is taken from the Books of Bokonon. It reads: ‘live by 
the foma that make you brave and kind and healthy and happy’ (2008: 
introductory page). Foma is one of many made-up Bokononist terms. It means 
‘harmless untruths’. It can only be through an awareness of how inherently un-
real the writing act is—as with almost everything we do—that we can truly be 
said to be engaging in honest practice. Perhaps we can take a cue from 
Vonnegut and be unafraid of approaching very serious ideas without taking the 
method of our approach too seriously. Another term from Bokononism is 
granfalloon. It designates a team of people whose basis for association is 
meaningless, and it is a classic mechanism of limitation and control. Examples 
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given by Vonnegut are political parties, companies, and ‘any nation, anytime, 
anywhere’ (2008: 65). One could proffer other examples: ‘realist’ fiction, for 
one, or any artistic moment with the audacity to offer itself as the one and only 
real deal.   
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